China Labor Watch (CLW) submitted the following comments in response to the European Commissions call for public feedback on the implementation guidelines for the Forced Labor Regulation (FLR).
The Commission should consider to:
1. Clarify evidentiary thresholds for substantiated concern under Art. 9(2) using ILO indicators.
2. Accept triangulated, partial evidence where structural barriers limit documentation.
3. Adopt a victim-centered and harm-reduction approach to evidence assessment (Art. 14).
4. Avoid over-reliance on corporate-commissioned third-party audits.
5. Require quantifiable and publicly disclosed due diligence indicators (Art. 18).
6. Ensure direct and adequate worker remediation (Art. 37).
7. Allocate a portion of penalties to sustain independent investigation mechanisms.
Full texts below:
China Labor Watch Comments on the EU Forced Labor Regulation (FLR) Implementation Guidelines – Public Consultation
Background
China Labor Watch (CLW) is an independent labor rights organization founded in 2000. It has long been committed to researching labor conditions in global supply chains, with a particular focus on China’s manufacturing sector and labor conditions in overseas projects involving Chinese enterprises. Over more than two decades, CLW has published more than 100 factory investigation reports covering over 200 international brands and has directly contributed to forced labor enforcement actions pursued by the U.S. government under the Tariff Act of 1930 and the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA). This work has helped CLW develop extensive practical experience through field investigations, worker interviews, legal assistance, and policy research—especially in identifying forced labor risks, documenting the limitations of corporate due diligence, and addressing gaps in remediation mechanisms.
CLW welcomes the European Commission’s public consultation on the implementation guidelines for the Forced Labor Regulation (FLR) and believes that the Regulation has the potential to become a major institutional instrument in the global fight against forced labor, especially as the Regulation demands a shared database, joined investigation authority, and enforcement coordination among EU member states. Drawing on our practical experience, and in light of the relevant provisions of the FLR, we respectfully submit the following comments and recommendations regarding its implementation.
In developing the guidance for the practical implementation of the FLR, in particular Article 9, 14, 17, 18, and 20, the Commission should:
1. Establish concrete and coherent evidentiary requirements to establish “substantiated concern” for forced labor (Art. 9(2)).
As per the ILO definition, a situation of forced labor may be established where at least one indicator of involuntariness and one indicator of coercion are present simultaneously. This framework can serve as a reference when determining evidentiary thresholds under the Regulation. Investigations should thereby be initiated on the basis of reasonable information indicative of coercion and the deprivation of informed consent.
2. Allow a range of different types of information that a submission may feasibly provide (Art. 9, 14(3))
Based on China Labor Watch’s (CLW) experience, complainants are often unable to obtain complete corporate documentation at the reporting stage. Given that many forced labor risks occur outside the EU, competent authorities will often need to depend on indirect evidence and independent reporting. Implementation guidance should therefore explicitly recognize the structural limitations of cross-border evidence gathering. Therefore, in determining the types of material sufficient to trigger inquiry, the Commission and relevant state authorities should consider what complainants can realistically provide, and accept information from multiple sources as a basis of “reasonable information.”
Complaint submissions may include the following types of information:
(1) Basic Case Information, including:
- Name of the enterprise or factory
- Production location or project site
- Type of product or industry sector
- General supply chain relations (e.g., general shipment destination, client name)
(2) Risk indicators, including:
- Recruitment fees paid by workers
- Wage arrears or wage withholding
- (Excessive) Working hours
- Restrictions on freedom of movement
- Confiscation or retention of identity documents
- Threats or punitive measures
- Restrictions on resignation or termination
- Poor working or living conditions
- Exploitation of worker vulnerability
- Deceptive recruitment practices
- Vague or illegal contract conditions
- Occupational safety conditions
(3) Worker testimony or interview records (where available):
- Interview summaries
- Group testimonies
- Diary-style online entries
Worker testimony is often the most direct source of information regarding coercion and involuntariness. In high-risk environments, anonymous testimony may be the only feasible means of reporting.
(4) Supporting materials (where available), including:
- Wage slips
- Recorded work schedules
- Recruitment advertisements
- Employment contracts
- Recruitment advertisements
- Evidence of document confiscation
- Photographs of working or living conditions
- Workplace safety rules and procedures
The above forms of information, in different combinations, may support a finding of substantiated concern. Such materials may originate from worker testimony, correspondence with civil society organizations, media reporting, or publicly available social media content.
In high-risk environments where direct access to workers or internal documentation is restricted, forced labor risks must often be identified through the triangulation of multiple partial sources. In one case, CLW obtained initial evidence including workers’ employment contracts and evidence that the factory had confiscated workers’ passports. Based on this information, the organization conducted interviews with approximately 30 workers and confirmed that the relevant conditions were widespread. Multiple workers also reported wage withholding, excessive recruitment fees, and falsified employment contracts. Yet none produced verifiable company records of such conducts.
The absence of comprehensive, documented evidence should not preclude the initiation of an investigation where reasonable and coherent indicators are present. If evidentiary thresholds are interpreted too strictly, the FLR risks replicating the structural weaknesses previously observed in corporate social responsibility frameworks.
3. Implement a victim-centered approach to evidence assessment and whistleblower protection (Art. 14(3)).
Pursuant to Article 14(3) of the FLR, the assessment of the likelihood of a violation of Article 3 must be based on all relevant, factual, and verifiable information available to the competent authorities. In applying this provision, implementation guidelines should clarify that evidence assessment must be conducted with a victim-centered approach, grounded in the principle of harm reduction and responsive to the realities faced by affected workers.
In certain contexts, obtaining corporate documentation may be practically difficult and may expose workers to retaliation. Some enterprises require workers, upon hiring, to sign confidentiality clauses covering employment contracts, wage slips, overtime records, wage calculation methods, and internal disciplinary systems. Disclosure of such information may therefore expose workers to legal risks. In 2025, CLW’s investigations across more than ten factories identified the widespread use of such confidentiality agreements.
In addition, structural conditions in some jurisdictions—including information control and workplace surveillance—may expose complainants to risks, even when complaints are initially made anonymously. In 2019, after CLW received an anonymous complaint from a worker at Foxconn Hengyang, the enterprise ultimately identified the whistleblower through reviewing surveillance footage, and initiated criminal proceedings for alleged disclosure of commercial secrets. The worker was sentenced to two years in prison, illustrating the significant risks faced by individuals who report labor violations. Under the current conditions, enforcement action is impossible in China, a production hub making nearly one-third of global manufacturing goods, if it requires traceable identification information from informants and access to company internal documents.
In light of these constraints, the absence of written, documented evidence should not be interpreted as the absence of risk. Further, the sharing or tracing of personally identifiable information of the affected victims should not be a standard of verifiability in the assessment of a violation of Article 3. Consistent with Article 14’s requirement to rely on all relevant and verifiable information, competent authorities should give appropriate evidentiary weight to worker testimony, publicly available information, and independent reporting, particularly where structural barriers limit access to internal company records. Where traceable individual witness testimony is required, appropriate whistleblower protection measures should be applied.
4. Triangulate information provided by economic operators (Art. 14, 17, 18).
In a risk-based investigative process under the FLR, information requested from economic operators — including corporate reporting on due diligence actions and corporate-commissioned third-party audit reports — should be assessed and systematically triangulated against other reasonable and credible evidence.
Cross-verification among different types of evidence strengthens the reliability and objectivity of investigative determinations. Independent information should therefore be carefully compared with documentation provided by the economic operator under assessment and, where relevant, by other suppliers in the supply chain. Such comparative assessment is essential to evaluate the credibility, depth, and effectiveness of the operator’s due diligence measures and to avoid over-reliance on company-controlled documentation.
In particular, corporate-commissioned third-party audit reports should not be treated as determinative or used as the sole basis for concluding that forced labor is absent, or that corrective actions have been applied. Third-party audits are typically financed by companies or their commercial stakeholders, and this financial relationship may affect the perceived or actual independence of the audit process. Moreover, such audits often involve limited timeframes, prior notification, and heavy reliance on documentation provided by the company itself — structural features that may make it difficult to accurately capture real and long-term working conditions, especially in high-risk environments where international auditors may encounter limited access.
CLW’s investigative experience shows that some enterprises continue to present serious labor problems, including forced labor risks, even after passing third-party social responsibility audits. Moreover, some enterprises have been observed to restore previous labor practices after a brief period of improvement once public scrutiny diminishes. This indicates that reliance on one-time assessment alone may be insufficient to effectively identify and mitigate ongoing risks.
5. Provide direct remediation for affected workers (Art. 37)
Where forced labor or related risks are confirmed, economic operators should proactively identify affected workers and provide timely and adequate financial compensation. Specifically, remediation mechanisms should not rely solely on economic operators to self-administer compensation but should include independent oversight or escrow-based mechanisms to ensure affected workers receive payment.
Compensation should include, but not be limited to:
- Unpaid or unlawfully withheld wages
- Recruitment or brokerage fees borne by workers
- Wage deductions or unlawful financial penalties
- Economic losses resulting from forced labor conditions
- Damage for coercive or abusive working conditions
In appropriate circumstances, remediation amounts may exceed workers’ direct financial losses in order to provide corrective and deterrent effect, particularly where violations were systemic or prolonged. Remediation should be accessible, transparent, and structured in a manner that does not expose workers to further risk.
6. Allocate funds to support investigation and evidence collection (Art. 37)
CLW’s experience demonstrates that forced labor investigations—especially when employed to produce credible evidence to support enforcement—require substantial professional resources, including long-term field research, worker interviews, documentation review, evidence preservation, and legal analysis. Such work is highly specialized and often difficult to sustain solely through foundation or public funding.
In this context, consideration could be given to allocating a portion of administrative penalties or remediation-related payments to support the complainants’ investigative work.
Such funding could be used to:
- Support independent organizations conducting evidence collection and worker interviews
- Maintain secure reporting and complaint channels
- Support ongoing monitoring and follow-up activities
- Strengthen documentation and case management systems
Allocating part of penalties to sustain investigative and reporting systems would enhance enforcement capacity and improve the effectiveness of forced labor risk identification.
7. Ensure best practices for due diligence across sectors and transparency requirements (Art. 18)
The Commission should strengthen transparency requirements and clarify best practices for corporate due diligence related to forced labor risk identification.
Based on the experience of China Labor Watch (CLW), one of the most significant challenges in current due diligence practices is insufficient transparency. A substantial proportion of due diligence assessments are conducted by third-party entities commissioned by companies, yet the methodologies applied, evidence reviewed, and detailed findings are often not publicly disclosed or are only partially reported. This limits the ability of external stakeholders—including civil society organizations, trade unions, researchers, and affected communities—to conduct independent evaluation or verification.
As such when establishing sector-specific best practices, implementation guidance should strengthen disclosure requirements and promote greater transparency and verifiability in due diligence processes. Enhanced transparency is essential to ensure that due diligence functions as an effective risk identification tool rather than a formal compliance exercise.
7 (a). Ensure that economic operators use specific and quantifiable indicators to describe labor conditions in disclosures (Art. 18)
The Commission should promote the use of clear and quantifiable indicators to describe labor conditions at factories or production sites in economic operators’ due diligence reporting. General or conclusory statements—such as assertions of “full compliance” or “no significant findings”—are insufficient where they are not supported by concrete data. To enhance transparency and credibility, economic operator reports should, where feasible, include specific information such as:
- Whether wage arrears, wage withholding, or unlawful deductions exist
Average, maximum, and minimum monthly working hours - Total overtime hours and whether overtime is compulsory
- Whether refusal of overtime results in penalties or adverse consequences
- The annual number, type, and severity of workplace injuries
- Whether worker passports, identity documents, or other personal documents are retained or confiscated
- Recruitment fee or brokerage fee arrangements, including amounts paid by workers
- Whether restrictions on resignation exist or financial penalties are imposed for leaving employment
- Living and accommodation conditions (where provided by the employer)
- Whether management practices involve threats, intimidation, or punitive measures
When reporting on the indicators above, due diligence disclosures can, to the extent possible, be structured around the ILO’s indicators of forced labor, including: Abuse of vulnerability, Deception or fraudulent recruitment, Restriction of movement, Isolation or surveillance, Intimidation and threats, Retention of identity documents, Withholding of wages, Debt bondage, Abusive working and living conditions, Excessive overtime, Forced overtime.
The use of such indicators strengthens verifiability under Article 18 and enables civil society and competent authorities to conduct meaningful risk assessments and comparative re-assessment. It also reduces reliance on purely narrative or company-controlled summaries and enhances the overall credibility of due diligence outcomes.
7(b). Publicly disclose economic operator due diligence reporting (Art. 18)
The Commission should clarify that information submitted by economic operators in response to due diligence requests should, to the greatest extent possible, be made publicly accessible, subject to legitimate data protection considerations.
Meaningful public disclosure enhances transparency and strengthens the overall effectiveness of forced labor risk identification. Where due diligence findings, methodologies, and supporting data are sufficiently disclosed, independent organizations, researchers, trade unions, and civil society institutions can conduct field verification or comparative assessments based on the reported information. Such external scrutiny improves the quality and reliability of due diligence processes and reduces information asymmetry between economic operators and regulators, and ensures continued monitoring beyond one-time enforcement and corrective actions.
Conversely, where due diligence information remains confidential or only partially disclosed, independent verification becomes difficult or impossible. A lack of transparency may therefore undermine due diligence as a risk identification tool and weaken the overall effectiveness and credibility of regulatory enforcement under the FLR.
As an additional clarification, the labor condition information described above constitutes labor and human rights risk disclosure rather than commercially sensitive trade secrets. Accordingly, companies and third-party auditing bodies should not invoke commercial confidentiality as a basis to refuse disclosure of such information.
7(c). Support the use of independent third-party reports as supplementary due diligence sources (Art. 18)
While the FLR already recognizes that competent authorities may rely on a wide range of information sources, including civil society reporting, implementation guidance could further clarify that economic operators may also reference credible, publicly available independent reports as part of their own risk identification processes.
Independent investigative organizations have produced detailed sectoral and factory-level analyses identifying forced labor risks across global supply chains. Such reports are frequently cited by media, academic institutions, and policymakers, and in certain cases have contributed to measurable improvements in labor conditions.
In particular, for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) facing resource constraints, allowing reliance on credible independent risk reports as supplementary reference materials would:
- Reduce compliance burdens
- Improve efficiency in identifying high-risk sectors and suppliers
- Support proportionate implementation of due diligence obligations
- Enhance early-stage risk screening in complex supply chains
Such reliance should complement, rather than replace, an operator’s own due diligence responsibilities. However, recognizing independent public reports as reasonable reference sources would improve the practicality, accessibility, and proportionality of compliance under Article 18.
