{"id":7423,"date":"2024-05-03T20:37:17","date_gmt":"2024-05-03T20:37:17","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/chinalaborwatch.org\/?p=7423"},"modified":"2024-05-06T13:46:51","modified_gmt":"2024-05-06T13:46:51","slug":"a-siege-from-within-on-chinese-soes-operational-structure-case-papua-new-guinea","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/chinalaborwatch.org\/zh\/a-siege-from-within-on-chinese-soes-operational-structure-case-papua-new-guinea\/","title":{"rendered":"\u59cb\u4e8e\u5185\u90e8\u7684\u56f0\u5c40\uff1a\u56fd\u6709\u4f01\u4e1a\u7684\u8fd0\u8425\u7ed3\u6784--\u5df4\u5e03\u4e9a\u65b0\u51e0\u5185\u4e9a\u6848\u4f8b"},"content":{"rendered":"\t\t<div data-elementor-type=\"wp-post\" data-elementor-id=\"7423\" class=\"elementor elementor-7423\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<section class=\"elementor-section elementor-top-section elementor-element elementor-element-630837a5 elementor-section-boxed elementor-section-height-default elementor-section-height-default\" data-id=\"630837a5\" data-element_type=\"section\" data-e-type=\"section\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-container elementor-column-gap-default\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-column elementor-col-100 elementor-top-column elementor-element elementor-element-7bd3d821\" data-id=\"7bd3d821\" data-element_type=\"column\" data-e-type=\"column\">\n\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-wrap elementor-element-populated\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-95bd62e elementor-align-right elementor-widget elementor-widget-button\" data-id=\"95bd62e\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"button.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-button-wrapper\">\n\t\t\t\t\t<a class=\"elementor-button elementor-button-link elementor-size-sm\" href=\"https:\/\/chinalaborwatch.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/05\/A-Siege-from-Within.pdf\" target=\"_blank\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class=\"elementor-button-content-wrapper\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<span class=\"elementor-button-text\">Download Full Report<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/span>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/a>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-element elementor-element-4b031a79 elementor-widget elementor-widget-text-editor\" data-id=\"4b031a79\" data-element_type=\"widget\" data-e-type=\"widget\" data-widget_type=\"text-editor.default\">\n\t\t\t\t<div class=\"elementor-widget-container\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\n<h2><span style=\"color: #808080;\"><strong>Executive Summary<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Since the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, Chinese investment into Papua New Guinea (PNG) has burgeoned. Resulting from China\u2019s deepening economic relations with the island country, a new wave of Chinese migrants to PNG has occurred since 2012-13 and thousands of guest workers now participate in the construction of new harbors, highroads, and residential compounds.<\/p>\n<p><br \/>Chinese investments in PNG primarily cover the country\u2019s retail, construction and mining sectors, with the majority of funding being provided by state-owned enterprises.1 Overshadowed by the prominence of the geopolitical and economic relation between the two governments were the living conditions of Chinese guest workers in Papua New Guinea and their complicated relationships with the local communities. The COVID-19 pandemic also negatively impacted Chinese guest workers in PNG. While thousands of these guest workers were compelled to stay in PNG due to pandemic policies, interviewees told China Labor Watch (CLW) that the Chinese embassy and the local government in PNG only undertake parsimonious actions to mitigate the workers\u2019 crises.<\/p>\n<p><br \/>This report first provides a brief on the overall labor rights social conditions in PNG as well as the background of economic partnerships between PNG and China. Second, through case studies, the report seeks to offer a preliminary look into the everyday lives of Chinese guest workers. Findings from these case studies show that the organizational structure of Chinese SOEs provides a fertile ground for corruption and the lack of accountability, both issues that could breed further labor rights abuses and exploitations. These potential labor issues should be further studied beyond this preliminary case review.<\/p>\n<hr class=\"wp-block-separator has-alpha-channel-opacity\" \/>\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><a id=\"_ftn1\" href=\"#_ftnref1\"><sup>[1]<\/sup><\/a> Graeme Smith, \u201cBeijing\u2019s Orphans? New Chinese Investors in Papua New Guinea\u201d,\u00a0 <em>Pacific Affairs, V. 86.2, Global Perspective on Chinese Investment<\/em>, (June, 2013), pp 331, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/43590664\">h<\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/43590664\">ttps:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/43590664<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a id=\"_ftn1\" href=\"#_ftnref1\"><sup>[2]<\/sup><\/a> The data collection process involved in the writing of this report is done during the COVID-19 pandemic.\u00a0<\/p>\n<h2><a name=\"_Toc165562624\"><\/a><span style=\"color: #808080;\">Introduction<\/span><\/h2>\n<p>Papua New Guinea (PNG) is an island country north of Australia, located in the southwest region of the Pacific Ocean. It encompasses the eastern half of the island of New Guinea and outlying islands including New Ireland, New Britain and Bougainville. Situated along the Pacific Ring of Fire, the tropical country has several volcanoes and is prone to natural disasters such as earthquakes and tsunamis.<\/p>\n<p>With a population of close to 10 million, Papua New Guinea houses a variety of natural resources that are used to sustain economic development. Over 85 percent of its population lives in the rural area and the economy primarily relies on the agricultural, forestry, fishing, and the mineral and energy extraction industries\u2014all sectors that account for most of the country\u2019s export earnings and GDP.<a href=\"#_ftn1\" name=\"_ftnref1\"><sup>[1]<\/sup><\/a> With prosperity dependent on these natural resources, the government of PNG has been in search of avenues for national development. In this sense, China is an attractive partner that can boost PNG\u2019s industry growth and further infrastructure development.<\/p>\n<p>The nation has long established diplomatic relations with China since its independence from Australia in the 1970s. Largely adopting a national policy of neutrality after its independence in 1975, the government of PNG began to take a more assertive national development impetus. This includes the \u201cLooking North Policy,\u201d which sets PNG\u00a0 to, aside from the ongoing collaboration with its traditional partners such as New Zealand and Australia, open up to the nation\u2019s Asian neighbors and emulate their economic success.<a href=\"#_ftn2\" name=\"_ftnref2\"><sup>[2]<\/sup><\/a> The PNG government considers China a major partner in this\u00a0 development policy.<a href=\"#_ftn3\" name=\"_ftnref3\"><sup>[3]<\/sup><\/a> To date, PNG signed 14 memorandums of understanding with China, covering areas such as visa exemptions for diplomatic and official passport holders, grant aid for economic and technical cooperation, and trade promotion.<\/p>\n<p>\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Today China is among the largest export destinations for the country, contributing significantly to PNG&#8217;s economy.<a href=\"#_ftn4\" name=\"_ftnref4\"><sup>[4]<\/sup><\/a> Since President Xi Jinping\u2019s inauguration of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, Chinese investments in PNG have soared.<a href=\"#_ftn5\" name=\"_ftnref5\"><sup>[5]<\/sup><\/a> In 2017, PNG formally signed on to the Belt and Road Initiative, with Prime Minister Peter O\u2019Neill asserting that \u201cChina is one of our strongest development partners.\u201d<a href=\"#_ftn6\" name=\"_ftnref6\"><sup>[6]<\/sup><\/a> Chinese investments in Papua New Guinea have expanded noticeably, reaching an annual sum of $4.46 billion by 2021.<a href=\"#_ftn7\" name=\"_ftnref7\"><sup>[7]<\/sup><\/a> The scale of economic cooperation between China and Papua New Guinea continues to grow as the two countries are set to sign a potential free-trade agreement.<\/p>\n<p>Specifically, a major part of the BRI in PNG was a project signed with China Railway Group to invest a total of $4 billion USD for new roads which run along the spine of PNG from the towns of Rabaul and Milne Bay in the east to the border town of Vanimo in the west. The transnational pathway is said to boost the transportation and sale of agricultural products, helping the PNG government to provide additional services such as universal education and more.<a href=\"#_ftn8\" name=\"_ftnref8\"><sup>[8]<\/sup><\/a>\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>However, PNG\u2019s close economic ties with China are not without its drawbacks. The PNG owes hundreds of million dollars to Chinese banks for telecommunication projects throughout the nation. Additionally, years since the initiation of such projects hundreds of towers have been broken and data centers are reportedly ripe with poor design choices. Meanwhile, as the PNG government is paying off these debts, further investments are needed to fund maintenance.<a href=\"#_ftn9\" name=\"_ftnref9\"><sup>[9]<\/sup><\/a> Chinese companies\u2019 unreliable conduct in foreign medical aid has also raised issues in medical supply in PNG.<a href=\"#_ftn10\" name=\"_ftnref10\"><sup>[10]<\/sup><\/a> In the mining sector, the US$2 billion Ramu nickel mine located in the Madang province was repeatedly criticized for alleged visa, labor rights, and safety violations.<a href=\"#_ftn11\" name=\"_ftnref11\"><sup>[11]<\/sup><\/a> Accordingly, when the previous Secretary of Labor David Tibu visited the site, local workers were paid rice and tinned fish in lieu of overtime pay.<a href=\"#_ftn12\" name=\"_ftnref12\"><sup>[12]<\/sup><\/a> Finally, the project has also been the target of a series of violent strikes by PNG workers and was shut down as a result of a horrific industrial accident. Concern over the environmental impact of some Chinese projects also rose.<a href=\"#_ftn13\" name=\"_ftnref13\"><sup>[13]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Negative sentiments towards Chinese migrant workers and the PNG officials brew among the locals too, as locals refer to them as \u2018kong kong\u2019, a Tok Pisin expression (likely derived from Hong Kong) that covers all Asians.<a href=\"#_ftn14\" name=\"_ftnref14\"><sup>[14]<\/sup><\/a> Anti-Chinese riots and murders targeting Chinese retailers occurred sporadically over the past decade. Various sources also documented locals\u2019 dismay towards PNG officials for alleged bribery and corruption among PNG government officials\u2013high and low\u2013involved in Chinese investments.<a href=\"#_ftn15\" name=\"_ftnref15\"><sup>[15]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Tensions exist in the realm of geopolitics too. A member of the non-Aligned Movement (NAM) states, PNG was caught in the power rivalry between China and the West\u2014Australia, in particular. In 2018, Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison and PNG President Peter O\u2019Neill signed a bilateral arrangement committing both countries to building a joint naval base on PNG\u2019s northerly island province of Manus,<a href=\"#_ftn16\" name=\"_ftnref16\"><sup>[16]<\/sup><\/a> a move that observers regard as PGN \u201ctaking sides.\u201d<a href=\"#_ftn17\" name=\"_ftnref17\"><sup>[17]<\/sup><\/a> Moreover, in 2022, after China signed a security treaty with the neighboring Solomon Islands, PNG began discussion of a security treaty with Australia.<a href=\"#_ftn18\" name=\"_ftnref18\"><sup>[18]<\/sup><\/a> Researchers in international relations and security studies also tend to interpret the upsurge of Chinese presence in PNG as a sign of China\u2019s geo-political ambition to reshape its own energy infrastructure and to implement its \u201cGrand Strategy\u201d in the global power arena.<a href=\"#_ftn19\" name=\"_ftnref19\"><sup>[19]<\/sup><\/a> PNG\u2019s economic relations with China, however, continued. PNG\u2019s leaders are now more careful\u2014according to the Lowy Institute, and no Pacific nation except Vanuatu has taken on new debt from China since 2018.<a href=\"#_ftn20\" name=\"_ftnref20\"><sup>[20]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>In this sense, Chinese investment not only brought the development-eager PNG economic growth, but exacerbated the country\u2019s social, environmental, and political issues. Among these issues, however, labor rights concerns are rarely raised. To bridge this gap, this report presents a preliminary case review of a Chinese SOE\u2019s operation and Chinese workers conditions in PNG. This provides grounds for future research. This report first establishes an overview of PNG and China\u2019s economic cooperations. Second, through a case study, we offer a look at the structural and organizational idiosyncrasies of a Chinese SOE operating in PNG. Third, we offer two workers\u2019 testimonies highlighting some of the issues faced by Chinese workers in the island country.<\/p>\n<p>This report is based on document review and contacts with six Chinese workers in PNG. Among these six workers, we focus on two of them as case studies for understanding Chinese SOE workers\u2019 experiences and developing interpretations of current layouts. Our report hopes to offer a preliminary look into the general conditions of Chinese capital investment in PNG, and Chinese guest workers\u2019 conditions under this institutional background. Based on this preliminary case study, Chinese SOEs\u2019 organization structure appears to breed corruption and lack of accountability. It establishes the need for a more in-depth look into the more general conditions among other workers closer to the ground.<\/p>\n<p>\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>\u00a0<\/p>\n<h2><a name=\"_Toc165562625\"><\/a><span style=\"color: #808080;\"><strong>Methodologies<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n<p>This report incorporates online archival research with interviewing. China Labor Watch retrieves official data from the Chinese government\u2019s annual reports, the statement of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, and the official documents from the Papua New Guinea government. Aside from these, media reports and writings from various civil society organizations are referenced, too. This collection of archival records, complementary news articles, and relevant academic journals constitutes the primary source for our research. Additionally, China Labor Watch has interviewed six formally contracted workers who have experience working in Chinese companies during the pandemic in PNG. We inquire interviewees about their companies\u2019 managerial cultures, organizational structures, demographic compositions, and gender ratios. Moreover, we associate workers\u2019 feedback with the broader political contexts in China to establish a complete and in-depth narrative of workers\u2019 experiences in a Chinese SOE in PNG.<\/p>\n<p>\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>\u00a0<\/p>\n<h2><a name=\"_Toc165562626\"><\/a><span style=\"color: #808080;\">An Overview of Chinese Immigration in Papua New Guinea<\/span><\/h2>\n<p>With a population of about 20,000 ethnic Chinese, Papua New Guinea is home to the largest Chinese diaspora among Pacific Island nations. According to Asian studies scholar James Chin, ethnic Chinese living in Papua New Guinea can be categorized into two groups. The first group, the \u201cold\u201d Chinese, are descendants of Chinese immigrants who left China between the late Tsing dynasty and the Chinese Civil War. The majority of this group of immigrants has since relocated to Australia, while the remnants have acquired strong Papua New Guinean national consciousness and fluency in English and Tok Pisin.<a href=\"#_ftn21\" name=\"_ftnref21\"><sup>[21]<\/sup><\/a> In comparison, the \u201cnew\u201d Chinese in Papua New Guinea refer to Malaysian, Singaporean, and Indonesian ethnic Chinese merchants pursuing wholesale trade and lumbering businesses. The \u201cnew\u201d Chinese are later joined by Chinese immigrants\u2013mainly from the Fujian province\u2013and Taiwanese immigrants who came to PNG in the 1990s.<a href=\"#_ftn22\" name=\"_ftnref22\"><sup>[22]<\/sup><\/a> Chin further noted that because of insufficient language training and cultural differences, the \u201cnew\u201d Chinese tend to develop hostile relationships with locals.<a href=\"#_ftn23\" name=\"_ftnref23\"><sup>[23]<\/sup><\/a> Interestingly, Pacific Affairs studies scholar Graeme Smith also argues that the \u201cnew\u201d Chinese, especially immigrants from Fuqing County in Fujian Province, have been stereotypically associated with organized crimes.<a href=\"#_ftn24\" name=\"_ftnref24\"><sup>[24]<\/sup><\/a> China Labor Watch\u2019s interview with one guest worker from Shandong Province also testifies to the relatively impaired reputation of Fuqing immigrants in PNG.<\/p>\n<p>However, the most recent influx of Chinese immigrants in PNG \u2013 the Chinese guest workers encouraged by China\u2019s grand national project, the Belt and Road Initiative \u2013 has not been systematically studied by scholars. The absence of precise data makes it difficult to study recent Chinese guest workers in PNG. China Labor Watch telephoned the Chinese Embassy in PNG on November 16, 2022, to discuss the total number of Chinese workers in PNG. Unfortunately, the embassy failed to offer a precise answer and alleged to be clueless about the current situation. \u201cApproximately a few thousand compatriots are still working in Papua New Guinea, but we don\u2019t know the exact number,\u201d says one staff member to China Labor Watch.<\/p>\n<p>Despite the lacuna in scholarships and public discourse, the conditions of Chinese guest workers in PNG have wider implications. First, comparing the Chinese guest workers in PNG with guest workers in other parts of the world, for example, Filipino guest workers in Hong Kong<a href=\"#_ftn25\" name=\"_ftnref25\"><sup>[25]<\/sup><\/a> and Turkish guest workers in Germany,<a href=\"#_ftn26\" name=\"_ftnref26\"><sup>[26]<\/sup><\/a> there seems to be an absence of an assimilation process with the local community. The underlying assumption is that Chinese workers in PNG neither have the intention nor action to join the local community. Instead, they thoroughly perceive the locals as an alien group with whom only limited contact is expected. Moreover, while locals hold negative perceptions toward Chinese workers, Chinese workers also hold similar negative views against local Papua New Guineans. Chinese workers in PNG stigmatize the local population with derogatory vocabularies like \u201cmonkeys\u201d(\u7334\u5b50), \u201cdirt people\u201d(\u571f\u4eba) and\u00a0 \u201cblack ghosts\u201d (\u9ed1\u9b3c). Instead of seeing them as Asians, most of the Chinese workers we interviewed associate Papua New Guineans with blacks or Africans. It is, therefore, important to highlight that Chinese guest workers in PNG should not be categorically defined as \u201cvictims&#8217;\u201d of overseas labor abuses or \u201caccomplices&#8221; against the local Melanesian, Papuans, Micronesians, and Polynesian communities. The reality demands nuanced studies on individual cases to understand these complex relations. As we shall explain in this report, it is quite common that a worker is simultaneously the victim of autocratic management and an abuser against local Papuan employees.<\/p>\n<p><strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n<h2><span style=\"color: #808080;\"><strong>Major Forms of the Labor Right Violations<\/strong><\/span><\/h2>\n<p>Based on archival research and in-depth interviewing, China Labor Watch synthesized the following major forms of labor rights infringement experienced by Chinese guest workers in Papua New Guinea.<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>Autocratic and abusive management in Chinese State-owned Enterprises<\/li>\n<li>Prolonged working hours<\/li>\n<li>Restriction of personal freedom<\/li>\n<li>Coercion and physical violence in the hands of private business owners against unprotected workers<\/li>\n<li>Ethnic and economic conflicts with the native population<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>Some of the institutional issues that structured Chinese workers\u2019 experiences include:<\/p>\n<ol>\n<li>Cultural segregation from the local community<\/li>\n<li>Lack of legal and diplomatic support from the Chinese Embassy<\/li>\n<li>Restrictions of freedom and exacerbation of existing abuses during the COVID pandemic<\/li>\n<li>Corruption and nepotism in the leadership of Chinese State-owned Enterprises<\/li>\n<li>Corruption in the PNG police and state authorities<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>The following pages are detailed reports from China Labor Watch. The first section reviews the structural composition and statistics of Chinese firms in Papua New Guinea with a focus on State-owned Enterprises. In this section, we will examine labor abuses in State-owned Enterprises with reference to testimonies provided by their employees. The second section studies the working conditions and labor rights violations in Chinese private business sectors in PNG. These violations include physical violence, coercion, restriction of freedom, and verbal harassment. The third section focuses on the ethnic and economic conflicts between Chinese workers and Papua New Guineans. The title of our report \u2013 \u201ca Siege from Within\u201d \u2013 suggests two major hardships of Chinese workers: 1. Their isolation from the local society in PNG; and 2. China\u2019s strict detainment and quarantine policies prevent workers from returning home.<\/p>\n<p>\u00a0<\/p>\n<h3><span style=\"color: #808080;\"><strong>Section I. The Structure and Management of Chinese Investments in PNG<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n<p>According to the \u201c2021 Investment Instruction\u201d issued by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, Papua New Guinea has become China\u2019s largest trading partner among Pacific Islander countries. Major Chinese exports to PNG include 1. electronic and machinery products; 2. textiles and apparel; and 3. Steels. As an exchange, China imports from PNG: 1. liquefied natural gas; 2. raw lumber and wood products; and 3. raw nickel and nickel products.<a href=\"#_ftn27\" name=\"_ftnref27\"><sup>[27]<\/sup><\/a> In addition to international trade, Chinese investments in Papua New Guinea are heavily focused on the construction and mining industries. Moreover, the instruction indicates that Chinese investments in PNG are predominantly funded by the Central State-owned Enterprises, which are exclusively commanded by the CCP\u2019s Central Committee. Below is the list of major Chinese corporations in Papua New Guinea. <a href=\"#_ftn28\" name=\"_ftnref28\"><sup>[28]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>\u00a0<\/p>\n<table width=\"523\">\n<tbody>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"188\">\n<p><strong>Chinese Official Name<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"168\">\n<p><strong>English Translation<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"167\">\n<p><strong>Website<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"188\">\n<p>\u4e2d\u56fd\u4e2d\u94c1\u56fd\u9645\u5357\u592a\u5e73\u6d0b\u516c\u53f8<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"168\">\n<p>China Railway International. Group South Pacific Branch<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"167\">\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.crecgi.com\/\">http:\/\/www.crecgi.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"188\">\n<p>\u4e2d\u56fd\u6e2f\u6e7e\uff08\u5df4\u5e03\u4e9a\u65b0\u51e0\u5185\u4e9a\uff09\u8d23\u4efb\u6709\u9650\u516c\u53f8<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"168\">\n<p>China Harbour (Papua New Guinea) Engineering Co. Ltd<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"167\">\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.chec.bj.cn\/\">https:\/\/www.chec.bj.cn\/<\/a><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"188\">\n<p>\u4e2d\u56fd\u6c5f\u82cf\u56fd\u9645\u7ecf\u6d4e\u6280\u672f\u5408\u4f5c\u96c6\u56e2\u6709\u9650\u516c\u53f8\u5df4\u65b0\u5206\u516c\u53f8<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"168\">\n<p>China Jiangsu International PNG Branch<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"167\">\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.zjgj.com\/\">http:\/\/www.zjgj.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"188\">\n<p>\u4e2d\u94c1\u5efa\u5de5\u96c6\u56e2\u5df4\u65b0\u6709\u9650\u516c\u53f8<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"168\">\n<p>China Railway Engineering Corporation PNG Branch<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"167\">\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.crecg.com\/\">http:\/\/www.crecg.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"188\">\n<p>\u4e2d\u94c1\u5efa\u8bbe\u96c6\u56e2\u6709\u9650\u516c\u53f8<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"168\">\n<p>China Railway Construction Group Corporation<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"167\">\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.crcc.cn\/\">http:\/\/www.crcc.cn\/<\/a><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"188\">\n<p>\u4e2d\u56fd\u5efa\u6750\u6295\u8d44\u6709\u9650\u516c\u53f8\u5df4\u65b0\u5206\u516c\u53f8<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"168\">\n<p>CNBM Investment Company. Limited PNG Branch<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"167\">\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.cnbm-i.com\/\">http:\/\/www.cnbm-i.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"188\">\n<p>\u4e2d\u56fd\u6c5f\u897f\u56fd\u9645\u7ecf\u6d4e\u6280\u672f\u5408\u4f5c\u516c\u53f8\u5df4\u65b0\u5de5\u7a0b\u6709\u9650\u516c\u53f8<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"168\">\n<p>China Jiangxi International Economic and Technical Corporation. Ltd PNG Branch<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"167\">\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.cjic.cn\/\">https:\/\/www.cjic.cn\/<\/a><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"188\">\n<p>\u845b\u6d32\u575d\u96c6\u56e2\u5df4\u5e03\u4e9a\u65b0\u51e0\u5185\u4e9a\u6709\u9650\u516c\u53f8<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"168\">\n<p>China Gezhouba CO. LTD<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"167\">\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.cggc.ceec.net.cn\/\">http:\/\/www.cggc.ceec.net.cn\/<\/a><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"188\">\n<p>\u4e2d\u56fd\u6b66\u5937\u5df4\u5e03\u4e9a\u65b0\u51e0\u5185\u4e9a\u5206\u516c\u53f8<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"168\">\n<p>China Wuyi Group PNG Branch<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"167\">\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.chinawuyi.com.cn\/\">https:\/\/www.chinawuyi.com.cn\/<\/a><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"188\">\n<p>\u4e2d\u56fd\u6c88\u9633\u56fd\u9645\u7ecf\u6d4e\u6280\u672f\u5408\u4f5c\u6709\u9650\u516c\u53f8\u5df4\u65b0\u5206\u516c\u53f8<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"168\">\n<p>China Shenyang International Corporation (PNG) LTD<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"167\">\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.csyic.com.cn\/intro\/3.html\">https:\/\/www.csyic.com.cn\/intro\/3.html<\/a><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"188\">\n<p>\u4e2d\u94c1\u56fd\u9645\u96c6\u56e2\u6709\u9650\u516c\u53f8\u5df4\u65b0\u5206\u516c\u53f8<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"168\">\n<p>China Railway International, Group. (PNG)<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"167\">\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.crecgi.com\/\">http:\/\/www.crecgi.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"188\">\n<p>\u4e2d\u56fd\u6c34\u7535\u5df4\u5e03\u4e9a\u65b0\u51e0\u5185\u4e9a\u5206\u516c\u53f8<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"168\">\n<p>Sinohydro Group Limited<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"167\">\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.chinafec.com\/Default\">https:\/\/www.chinafec.com\/Default<\/a><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"188\">\n<p>\u534e\u4e3a\u6280\u672f\u6709\u9650\u516c\u53f8\u5df4\u65b0\u4ee3\u8868\u5904<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"168\">\n<p>Huawei Technologies CO.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"167\">\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/e.huawei.com\/cn\/\">https:\/\/e.huawei.com\/cn\/<\/a><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"188\">\n<p>\u745e\u6728\u954d\u94ec\u7ba1\u7406\uff08\u4e2d\u51b6\uff09\u6709\u9650\u516c\u53f8<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"168\">\n<p>Ramu Nico Management (MCC) LTD<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"167\">\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.ramunico.com\/\">https:\/\/www.ramunico.com\/<\/a><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"188\">\n<p>\u4e2d\u56fd\u5341\u4e5d\u51b6\u96c6\u56e2\u6709\u9650\u516c\u53f8<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"168\">\n<p>China 19th Metallurgical Group Corporation Limited<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"167\">\n<p><a href=\"http:\/\/www.19mcc.com.cn\/\">http:\/\/www.19mcc.com.cn\/<\/a><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr>\n<td width=\"188\">\n<p>\u4e2d\u5efa\u79d1\u5de5\u5df4\u65b0\u5206\u516c\u53f8<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"168\">\n<p>China Construction Science and Industry Corporation LTD<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td width=\"167\">\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/sstr.cscec.com\/gywm31\/gsjj31\/202206\/3546808.html\">https:\/\/sstr.cscec.com\/gywm31\/gsjj31\/202206\/3546808.html<\/a><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p>\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 (Table 1, Chinese Major Investments in PNG<a href=\"#_ftn29\" name=\"_ftnref29\"><sup>[29]<\/sup><\/a>)<\/p>\n<p>\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>One distinctive feature of China\u2019s state capitalism is the central role of SOEs controlled by the state-party\u2019s government organs, especially in critical industries such as crude material, steel, telecom, and transportation.<\/p>\n<p>Aside from Chinese capital and manpower, these SOEs also import Chinese management culture and CCP\u2019s party organizations to PNG. For one thing, these state-owned enterprises are managed by a top-down model with its management having little or no democratic participation from the rank-and-file workers. Normally, the top executive positions are\u00a0 filled by persons directly \u201cparachuted\u201d from company headquarters in Beijing. Often connected to other SOEs with a shareholding or joint relationship, each company\u2019s majority shareholder core (parent) company coordinates the group\u2019s activities and transmits business policy to group members, who are contractually bound to promote the policies of the state. Moreover, the management apparatus of these corporations incorporate political education\/indoctrination through various Party-building work [\u515a\u5efa\u5de5\u4f5c] (PBW). Embedded in various Chinese SOEs are Chinese Communist Party (CCP) apparatus such as Party branches (\u515a\u652f\u90e8) and corporate Party committee (\u516c\u53f8\u515a\u59d4). These CCP organs within companies set up routine practices to ensure personnel\u2019s loyalty to the Party and that corporate activities of said companies align with CCP central economic or political interests and goals. These CCP branches follow set templates and major corporate decisions need to be approved by Party committees (\u516c\u53f8\u515a\u59d4) that are embedded in Chinese SOEs.\u00a0 This effectively renders corporate decision-making one that centers CCP politics. According to <em>Guangming Daily<\/em>, a propaganda organ of the CCP, Chinese SOE (State-owned Enterprises) have two major political objectives: 1. Adhering to social responsibility (\u627f\u62c5\u4f01\u4e1a\u793e\u4f1a\u8d23\u4efb); and 2. Following the Party\u2019s leadership (\u542c\u515a\u6307\u6325). In other words, with Party organs embedded in corporate structure and CCP goals and interests guiding corporate management and corporate daily activities, Chinese SOEs are not mere private business entities, but rather state-affiliates following the Chinese government\u2019s centralized leadership. The political-oriented corporate management became more dominant when Xi Jinping began to stress Party building work as an expressed policy focus, coupled with far-reaching implementation measures across virtually all forms of civil society and corporate entities as early as in 2012. In a show of Xi\u2019s Party-focused resolution, he explicitly decrees in a speech that \u201cInsisting on the Party\u2019s leadership and strengthening the Party-building are glorious traditions of the State-owned Enterprises in our country. They are also the \u201croot\u201d, \u201csoul\u201d, and the unique institutional advantages of our SOEs\u201d.<a href=\"#_ftn30\" name=\"_ftnref30\"><sup>[30]<\/sup><\/a> The top-down bureaucracy of Chinese SOEs is further strengthened when Xi replaces \u201cCollective Leadership\u201d (\u96c6\u4f53\u9886\u5bfc\u5236) with the \u201cPrime Respondent Norm\u201d (\u7b2c\u4e00\u8d23\u4efb\u4eba\u5236), which aggrandizes power and responsibility associated with SOEs\u2019 top leaderships\u2013who are, incidentally, CCP officials by law\u2013by offering them a seemingly dictatorial power.<a href=\"#_ftn31\" name=\"_ftnref31\"><sup>[31]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>Xi\u2019s vision of the Party\u2019s leadership as the \u201croot\u201d and \u201csoul\u201d of \u201cour\u201d SOEs suggests a strong inclination toward an aesthetic value judgment in addition to the CCP\u2019s formal bureaucratic ethics. The top-down organizational and managerial structure common among all corporate businesses is, in essence, governed by what German sociologist Max Weber calls the \u201ciron cage of bureaucracy\u201d, a mechanized petrification of bureaucracy where rationality and pure functionality predominates. By contrast, in China\u2019s case, the political and ideological influence of the Party determines the ends and telos of all actions executed by SOEs. What\u2019s more important to note is that the rhetoric of \u201croot\u201d and \u201csoul\u201d not only suggests the nature of SOEs but also, more importantly, it signifies the one-dimensional power relationship that centers the power of the party-state in corporate affairs. This rhetoric suggests an irreversible genitive possession where the Party and its unwavering leadership become the genesis, whereas the day-to-day business routine occupies a secondary and derivative status.<\/p>\n<p>The Party\u2019s leadership being the \u201croot\u201d and \u201csoul\u201d also means that there is a lack of reciprocal and interactive power relationships between different hierarchies in SOEs. While the lower-ranking bureaucrats and workers adhere to the orders of higher-level authorities, they are left little leeway to determine how to act and reflect their opinions. In the following section, Ramu Nico Management is examined as a case study to dissect how this centralized power functions in a Chinese SOE operating in a foreign country in reality.<\/p>\n<p>\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>\u00a0<\/p>\n<h2><span style=\"color: #808080;\"><a style=\"color: #808080;\" name=\"_Toc165562627\"><\/a>A Case Study on \u201cRamu Nico Management (MCC) LTD\u201d<\/span><\/h2>\n<p>China Labor Watch conducted a case study on Ramu Nico Management to offer a nuanced observation of the ground-level functionality of Chinese SOEs in PNG. On the one hand, we choose Ramu because its major business practice \u2013\u2013 nickel\/cobalt excavation \u2014 is one of the major areas of Chinese state-owned investments in PNG. Ramu is one of the biggest Chinese investments in PNG and arguably the most important project undertaken by the Road and Belt Initiative in the South Pacific. The mining sites and refinement facilities are all located in non-residential areas of Madang Province and are far away from urban centers. The company\u2019s Chinese website claims that Ramu is China\u2019s largest overseas investment in nickel\/cobalt mining, and China\u2019s overall largest investment in the South Pacific region thus far.<a href=\"#_ftn32\" name=\"_ftnref32\"><sup>[32]<\/sup><\/a> As the flagship project, Ramu is renowned among Chinese investments in PNG. Like most other SOEs, the working conditions in Ramu were intensive and workers were insulated from the local society. Many interviewees tell China Labor Watch that working for Ramu is safer and better paid than other jobs in construction companies or retail businesses. However, the project also has a long-standing troubled relationship and negative reputation in the local community due to its alleged environmental impact and labor abuses.<\/p>\n<p>In our case study, Ramu\u2019s organizational structure and its draconian management suggests that rank-and-file workers at Raum lack credible healthcare, had limited space for free speech and movement, and witnessed systematic corruption of the management teams. As labor and organizational structure scholars Guang Yang and Lixin Yang argued in reference to their observation about Chinese lean manufacturing industries, SOE\u2019s structural reforms since the 1990s have abolished the socialist ideal of reciprocal employment relations. Instead, the management of the Chinese manufacturing industry is characterized by centralized commands given by managers and factory directors.<a href=\"#_ftn33\" name=\"_ftnref33\"><sup>[33]<\/sup><\/a> The centralized management culture turns employment with SOE prone to changes and managers\u2019 discretionary power. For rank-and-file workers, the so-called \u201cthree old irons\u201d<a href=\"#_ftn34\" name=\"_ftnref34\"><sup>[34]<\/sup><\/a> that was once associated with SOE no longer protest them under new regulations.<\/p>\n<p>Ramu\u2019s organizational structure incorporates both the traditional \u201cthree irons\u201d and the short-term contract works and outsourced labor. However, unlike the old \u201cthree irons\u201d that are jointly shared by managers and workers alike, Ramu only offers lifetime employment and associated welfare benefits to its higher- and middle-level managers, leaving the majority of contract workers vulnerable to layoffs and personnel changes. As a overseas subsidiary of China Minmetals Corporation (\u4e2d\u56fd\u4e94\u77ff\u96c6\u56e2\u516c\u53f8), Ramu\u2019s management team are transferred from the parent company and has signed life-long contracts with said parent company. By comparison, rank-and-file workers are often recruited directly by Raum through short-term contracts, or through third-party labor recruiters.<\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"aligncenter wp-image-7424 size-full\" src=\"https:\/\/chinalaborwatch.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/05\/Ramu.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"672\" height=\"238\" \/><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\"><em>Figure 1 The Organizational Framework of Ramu, downloaded from Ramu Website<a href=\"#_ftn35\" name=\"_ftnref35\"><sup><strong>[35]<\/strong><\/sup><\/a><\/em><\/p>\n<p>The above graph shows Ramu\u2019s management structure. The top Operational Management Team (\u8fd0\u8425\u7ba1\u7406\u5c42) holistically commends all branches of the company without intermediaries. This top-down structure first suggests that the functionality of each specific department is contingent on the centralized top management team. Departments are not required to understand or possess a complete picture of the company\u2019s function, but only process the specific functionality and tasks assigned from higher management. Second, this structure indicates the lack of feedback mechanisms and reciprocal power relationships. The downward-pointing arrows signify Ramu\u2019s bureaucratic hierarchy \u2014 a one-dimensional process with little to no feedback and interactions. In such regard, Ramu\u2019s management structure is rather archaic, if not anachronistic, since this structural layout reveals no elements of overlapping networks (the indication of cross-team work) or reciprocal weak-ties (the indication of grass-root democracy).<a href=\"#_ftn36\" name=\"_ftnref36\"><sup>[36]<\/sup><\/a> Instead, this system adheres more to what George Simmel describes as \u201csocial symmetry,\u201d the ruling of many from a single point.<a href=\"#_ftn37\" name=\"_ftnref37\"><sup>[37]<\/sup><\/a> Such despotism expresses an idea that an institution as a whole should become a work of art in which every single element attains its meaning by its functionalities to wholeness. In Ramu, unified plans directed by the Beijing headquarter and the management team determine the company\u2019s production. Moreover, as Ramu is a subsidiary of a central state-owned company\u2013Chinese state-owned companies that are monitored by Chinese Communist Party\u2019s (CCP) central organs\u2013the company\u2019s major decision-making also needs to follow CCP\u2019s leadership and fulfill the company Party committee officials&#8217; political responsibilities to the central government. In other words, in this hierarchical structure of corporate management, decision-making centers the heads of the company, and they in turn follow the CCP\u2019s lead. For example, the homepage of Ramu\u2019s Chinese website is perfused with news reports on the speeches and actions of Wang Zhou (\u738b\u6d32), the company\u2019s Chair and Party Committee Secretary. Ramu updates news on its website biweekly. We examined the website\u2019s news reports between September 20 and November 4, 2022, and found that two-thirds of the reports are reserved for Wang Zhou alone.<a href=\"#_ftn38\" name=\"_ftnref38\"><sup>[38]<\/sup><\/a> Among the news releases on Wang Zhou, most of them record his conferences and meetings with state and provincial leaders in PNG or his speeches at the company\u2019s Party committee. The question is how workers and their daily lives are represented by the factory. At least on the official website of Ramu, the only information about individual workers are some photo collections of sports games to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the People\u2019s Republic of China and the company-organized feasts on Papua New Guinea&#8217;s independence day and the New Year.<\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"aligncenter wp-image-7425 size-full\" src=\"https:\/\/chinalaborwatch.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/05\/Court.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"417\" height=\"319\" \/><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\"><em>Figure 2 Basketball Competition for the 70th Anniversary of P.R. China, downloaded from Ramu Website.<\/em><\/p>\n<p>Legal scholars Li Wen-Lin and Curtis J. Milhaupt raise a similar critique in a keen article <em>We are the Champions.<\/em> They state that the administrative structure of Chinese SOEs can be defined as a \u201cnetworked hierarchy\u201d where vertically integrated hierarchies within a company are strategically linked to other business groups and institutions, facilitating information flow-from the bottom-up as well as from the top-down.<a href=\"#_ftn39\" name=\"_ftnref39\"><sup>[39]<\/sup><\/a> While this hypothesis captures the structural layout of Chinese SOEs on the strategic level, it has ignored the ground-level operations of overseas SOEs, which are desperately lacking in bottom-up information flow. Unlike their parent companies in China, the management culture in overseas SOEs tends to be more autocratic. For example, in Ramu, although the company establishes business and management networks with the local PNG capitals, these multi-centered and interrelated networks primarily occupy the funding aspect of corporate management. By contrast, the management and executive power are holistically entrusted to Ramu itself. The following diagram is downloaded from Ramu\u2019s website. It demonstrates the fact that RNML (Ramu Nickel Mining Leadership) is entrusted by its strategic shareholders in both China and PNG to manage the mining business.<\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-7426\" src=\"https:\/\/chinalaborwatch.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/05\/structure.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"515\" height=\"359\" \/><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\"><em>Figure 3 Ramu\u2019s Funding Sources, downloaded from Ramu Website<a href=\"#_ftn40\" name=\"_ftnref40\"><sup><strong>[40]<\/strong><\/sup><\/a><\/em><\/p>\n<p>Despite the seemingly \u201cnetworked hierarchy\u201d in Ramu\u2019s superstructure, one of China Labor Watch\u2019s interviewees, Doctor Hang, told us that \u201cthere were absolutely no official channels to act in a bottom-up way at Ramu.\u201d Doctor Hang worked for Ramu as a physician at the mining sites in Madang Province between the summer of 2019 and the spring of 2022. Growing up in Heilongjiang Province, a northern borderland with Russia, Doctor Hang lived a socialist childhood with both parents working at a steel factory in Jiamusi City. Doctor Hang described his life in Jiamusi as \u201cpoor but peaceful.\u201d He spent his childhood and adolescence in schools affiliated with the steel factory and later on was admitted to a medical university in the provincial capital, Harbin. When the party-organized economic structural reform finally reached his parent\u2019s factory, leading to its bankruptcy in early 2000, Doctor Hang had already moved to Harbin. He finished undergraduate studies in five years but couldn\u2019t find a tenured job in a hospital. Instead, Doctor Hang worked at a local clinic in Harbin. In 2019, Doctor Zhang was hired by Ramu and worked there until 2021. He is currently preparing to pursue an M.D. Degree in Nuremberg, Germany.<\/p>\n<p>Doctor Hang told China Labor Watch that although parallel networks exist in Ramu, most rank-and-file miners from China are only at the bottom of Ramu\u2019s hierarchy. He said Australian engineers at Ramu had privileges such as free movement, free speech, and complete legal protection from overwork. By contrast, Ramu\u2019s management team had zero tolerance for protests and criticisms among Chinese miners.<\/p>\n<p>In addition to the typical \u201ctop-down\u201d model, Doctor Hang revealed in his testimony that decision-making in Ramu\u2013ranging from production quotas to COVID policies\u2013were solely determined by the company\u2019s CEO and two vice CEOs. Even the intermediate-level managers\u2013such as managing directors and team leaders\u2013did not have the power to make their own decisions. At the bottom of this hierarchy were Chinese miners who were not allowed a voice to protest the company\u2019s strict COVID policy or to rally to demand higher salaries. He tried to organize a rally with fellow miners and demand better food and pay during the COVID lockdown at the mining site in Madang. However, the company\u2019s response was repressive. After the brief protest, Doctor Hang was immediately discharged from all duties and transferred to the company\u2019s central office in Port Moresby, where he was put into solitary confinement in a dormitory. He told CLW that the security guards at the central office were veterans of the People\u2019s Liberation Army, who threatened him to shut his mouth. Other participants of his rally were also individually summoned by their managers and forced to swear that they would never join rallies again.<\/p>\n<p>Repressions did not end there. The company required all employees to \u201cvolunteer\u201d for COVID vaccination shots after the outbreak. Having received two doses of the Sinovac COVID-19 vaccines, Doctor Hang was soon diagnosed with Hives and Angioedema. He was, again, transferred from the company\u2019s central office to a hospital in Port Moresby. Due to the hospital\u2019s lack of preparation, Doctor Hang did not receive any proper treatments until he flew back to Shenyang, China, in 2021. He told CLW that he had to cover all of the medical expenses himself while the company only offered him two baskets of fruits as a condolence. Although his contract with Ramu specified that the company will pay for potential injuries and illnesses occurring at work in PNG, Ramu refused to cover Doctor Hang\u2019s medical expenses because he \u201cvolunteered\u201d for the COVID vaccines. In reality, according to Dr. Hang, as the company demanded for all employees to \u201cvolunteer\u201d for the vaccine before entering work, meaning these dubious vaccination shots could hardly be considered volunteer shots.<\/p>\n<p>Dr. Hang contacted the Chinese embassy in Papua New Guinea, and he did not receive any feedback.<\/p>\n<p>The picture painted by Dr. Hang was not a stand-alone case. Our contact with Mr. Shi, a worker at a state-owned construction company, also suggests that the management of Chinese SOEs in Papua New Guinea was despotic and corrupt. Unlike Doctor Hang, Mr. Shi had served in the Chinese People\u2019s Liberation Army before coming to PNG. His speeches revealed a strong inclination toward nationalism and patriotism. His WeChat ID pictures, for example, show a PLA commando soldier and an F-35 fighter jet. Mr. Shi told CLW that while PNG has beautiful natural landscapes, the safety of Chinese workers is constantly under threat. When asked what had caused the safety concerns, Mr. Shi said: \u201cMany reasons. Western countries had agitated hatred against China. But some Chinese in PNG also lack self-discipline&#8221;. Mr. Shi thought the locals disliked Chinese workers because of, in his mind, Western media\u2019s \u201cstigmatizations\u201d against China. This thought roughly represents the dominant beliefs shared among Chinese guest workers.<\/p>\n<p>When Dr. Hang posted his experiences in a group chat on WeChat, someone replied: \u201cThis netizen is a psycho; he did not follow the medical team&#8217;s instructions. Please don\u2019t be misguided by him. Otherwise, you will bear all responsibilities for any consequences incurred.\u201d Another worker said: \u201cI am sympathetic to your misfortune. You should seek help from the leaders of the Chinese embassy. We are all compatriots; they will not witness your tragedy but offer no help. Don\u2019t exaggerate or dramatize things, don\u2019t give the rival powers an excuse to attack our country.\u201d<\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-7427\" src=\"https:\/\/chinalaborwatch.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/05\/staff.png\" alt=\"\" width=\"335\" height=\"598\" \/><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\"><em>Figure 4 A Ramu staff member asks a sympathizer to recall and delete his supporting message to Doctor Hang<\/em><\/p>\n<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-7428\" src=\"https:\/\/chinalaborwatch.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/05\/staff2.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"347\" height=\"505\" \/><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\"><em>Figure 5 Doctor Hang\u2019s chat history with his manager at Ramu. The manager says: \u201cThe company did not inject you with the vaccine. You have signed the risk acknowledgement, and you volunteered for it.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n<p>Section 130 of the Employment Act of 1978 in Papua New Guinea has specified the medical responsibilities of employers: 1. Medical and other treatment provided by the employer at the place of employment shall be free of charge to the employees. 2. All necessary medical and other treatment required by an employee employed under an attested contract and his accompanying dependents shall be provided by the employer free of charge to the employee. and 3. Where an employer arranges for an employee or accompanying dependent to receive treatment or hospitalization, he shall, if the employee or accompanying dependent so desires\u2013 (a) arrange necessary transport and other facilities; and (b) take all reasonable steps to ensure the health, comfort and wellbeing of the employee or accompanying dependent during any travel that is necessary.<a href=\"#_ftn41\" name=\"_ftnref41\"><sup>[41]<\/sup><\/a> We witness from the case of Dr. Hang that Ramu did not properly adhere to this Employment Act. Rather, the company expressly rejected Hang\u2019s request for his medical expenses covered by the company.<\/p>\n<p>The quarantine period in PNG was tough for many workers. Mr. Shi, the veteran, told CLW that the management team of his construction company was extremely corrupt. \u201cThe leaders and secretaries locked workers in dorms, and they themselves drove to Port Moresby for prostitution\u201d, said Mr. Shi to CLW. He told us that some SOE managers feed the workers \u201cpig food\u201d[\u732a\u98df] while spending over 4,000 RMB (about US$583) per person for sexual services in Chinese KTVs and nightclubs in Port Moresby. Similar to Doctor Hang, Mr. Shi said physical violence and verbal harassment were occasionally used by the management team to control their workers. He further highlighted the lack of rule of law in PNG. \u201cThe Commission for Discipline Inspection [\u7eaa\u59d4] should really come and see what\u2019s happening here in PNG,\u201d Mr. Shi said with anger. Deep in his belief, the system and top leadership of the Communist Party and SOEs were good, the only issue was the fact that there were many corrupt officials like those in PNG.<\/p>\n<p>Both Dr. Hang and Mr. Shi, despite not holding Ramu\u2019s management positions, were not \u201clow-skilled\u201d workers relegated to the \u201cdirty work\u201d in the construction sites, mines, and forgeries. Their testimonies, however, uncovered important issues of how the company\u2019s hierarchical organizational structure breeds lack of accountability and stifles workers\u2019 voices. In this way, these two individual\u2019s experiences could open greater potential for further research into the struggle of those further down in the company who are considered to be doing the more dangerous and \u201cdirty work.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>\u00a0<\/p>\n<p>\u00a0<\/p>\n<h2><a name=\"_Toc165562628\"><\/a><span style=\"color: #808080;\">Conclusion<\/span><\/h2>\n<p>The testimonies of Dr. Hang and Mr. Shi suggests that Chinese guest workers in PNG are ruled by the discretionary powers of the SOE leaders and the PNG police authorities. \u201cThey (the police) would stop your car and demand you pay them tributes once they know you are Chinese,\u201d said Mr. Shi. The distance from family life and established social support back home and the strangeness of the local societies put Chinese guest workers under unique conditions. In PNG, workers found themselves to be neither protected by the law enforcement authorities of PNG nor by the civil and criminal laws of China. Indeed, in the eyes of PNG police and governmental institutions, Chinese guest workers belong to an alien group unprotected by the sovereign power of PNG. For example, the Employment Act of 1978 did not explicitly extend its protection to foreign employees and companies. Such lack of law and sovereignty refers to what political philosopher Giorgio Agamben defines as the \u201cstate of exception\u201d and \u201chomo sacer\u201d \u2014 the suspension of constitutional protection for a particular social group, the bare lives, who are deprived of representations within sovereignty and are subjected to discretional and full-power of the sovereignty.<a href=\"#_ftn42\" name=\"_ftnref42\"><sup>[42]<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>According to the standards of forced labor published by the International Labor Organization, the unfair experience of Doctor Hang and Mr. Shi had violated the international labor protocols. They suffered from isolation and abuses of vulnerability.<a href=\"#_ftn43\" name=\"_ftnref43\"><sup>[43]<\/sup><\/a> Moreover, the lack of response or support from the Chinese embassy and other diplomatic institutions also suggests the inadequate attention being paid toward Chinese workers.<\/p>\n<p>The Chinese officials\u2019 lack of protection for Chinese workers, despite the Party-state\u2019s extensive control apparatus, is telling. As we can observe in Papua New Guinea, it is clear that SOEs such as Ramu implement a centralized, hierarchical management system that consolidates power and control and positions such powers to such corporations\u2019 headquarters and, ultimately, Beijing. And it is in such ways that Chinese SOE\u2019s foreign ventures also become the Party-state\u2019s apparatus of its foreign expansion\u2013in its economic or, otherwise, political influence. Chinese SOEs cannot be conceptualized as independent business bodies, and their actions also cannot be considered as business actions alone. This is because, again, in Chinese SOEs\u2019 very organizational structures and in the structure of Chinese business groups is the baked-in centralized decision-making power and control of the Chinese Communist Party over these economic bodies.<\/p>\n<p>The Party has extended its control over its SOEs in their foreign operations not only through their organizational structures, but through practices such as their Party-Building Activities (the legality of such operations in different countries is, undoubtedly, questionable). Geographic distance and national sovereignty, in this sense, has not deterred the Party-state from consolidating its control over its business apparatuses abroad. However, geopolitical contests and the issue of sovereignty and noninterference is out of scope for this report. What is clear from the Chinese government\u2019s extensive control over overseas SOE\u2019s operations, however, is that the Party-state should also bear irrefutable responsibilities in the wrong-doings of these companies.<\/p>\n<p>CLW therefore urges the Chinese government to implement effective measures to protect the legal and labor rights of Chinese workers in Papua New Guinea. We also urge the state government of PNG to adopt legal and civil forces to protect and inspect the living conditions of foreign guest workers and examine Chinese companies\u2019 activities in accordance with its national interests. Furthermore, CLW calls the International Labor Organization, and the United Nations to push the Chinese government to reform its bureaucratic management cultures in SOEs in PNG.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref1\" name=\"_ftn1\"><sup>[1]<\/sup><\/a> The World Bank. \u201cPapua New Guinea Overview.\u201d <em>World Bank<\/em>. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.worldbank.org\/en\/country\/png\/overview\">https:\/\/www.worldbank.org\/en\/country\/png\/overview<\/a><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref2\" name=\"_ftn2\"><sup>[2]<\/sup><\/a> Imbun, Benedict. (2010). Look North Policy, Asian investment, and Papua New Guineans: A development trinity?. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.researchgate.net\/publication\/294669243_Look_North_Policy_Asian_investment_and_Papua_New_Guineans_A_development_trinity\">https:\/\/www.researchgate.net\/publication\/294669243_Look_North_Policy_Asian_investment_and_Papua_New_Guineans_A_development_trinity<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref3\" name=\"_ftn3\"><sup>[3]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref4\" name=\"_ftn4\"><sup>[4]<\/sup><\/a> Center For Collective Learning. \u201cOEC &#8211; Papua New Guinea (PNG) Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners.\u201d <em>Center for Collective Learning<\/em>, 2017. <a href=\"https:\/\/oec.world\/en\/profile\/country\/png\/\">https:\/\/oec.world\/en\/profile\/country\/png\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref5\" name=\"_ftn5\"><sup>[5]<\/sup><\/a> Zhang, Denghua. \u201cPapua New Guinea.\u201d <em>The People\u2019s Map of Global China<\/em>, 29 June 2021,<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/thepeoplesmap.net\/country\/papua-new-guinea\/#:~:text=People%2Dto%2Dpeople%20links%20between,in%20any%20Pacific%20Island%20nation\">https:\/\/thepeoplesmap.net\/country\/papua-new-guinea\/#:~:text=People%2Dto%2Dpeople%20links%20between,in%20any%20Pacific%20Island%20nation<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref6\" name=\"_ftn6\"><sup>[6]<\/sup><\/a> Smith, Graeme. \u201cDreams of Prosperity in Papua New Guinea.\u201d <em>The China Story<\/em>, 2017,<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.thechinastory.org\/yearbooks\/yearbook-2017\/forum-all-i-have-to-do-is-dream\/dreams-of-prosperity-in-papua-new-guinea\/\">https:\/\/www.thechinastory.org\/yearbooks\/yearbook-2017\/forum-all-i-have-to-do-is-dream\/dreams-of-prosperity-in-papua-new-guinea\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref7\" name=\"_ftn7\"><sup>[7]<\/sup><\/a> Sarah O\u2019Dowd, Bridging the Belt and Road Initiative in Papua New Guinea, <em>The China Alternative \u2013\u00a0 Changing Regional Order in the Pacific Islands<\/em>, ANU Press. (2021), <a href=\"https:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/j.ctv1h45mkn.17\">https:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/j.ctv1h45mkn.17<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref8\" name=\"_ftn8\"><sup>[8]<\/sup><\/a> Smith, Graeme. \u201cDreams of Prosperity in Papua New Guinea.\u201d <em>The China Story<\/em>, 2017,<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.thechinastory.org\/yearbooks\/yearbook-2017\/forum-all-i-have-to-do-is-dream\/dreams-of-prosperity-in-papua-new-guinea\/\">https:\/\/www.thechinastory.org\/yearbooks\/yearbook-2017\/forum-all-i-have-to-do-is-dream\/dreams-of-prosperity-in-papua-new-guinea\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref9\" name=\"_ftn9\"><sup>[9]<\/sup><\/a> Potter, Robert. \u201cPapua New Guinea and China\u2019s Debt Squeeze.\u201d <em>The Diplomat<\/em>, 2 Feb. 2021, <a href=\"https:\/\/thediplomat.com\/2021\/02\/papua-new-guinea-and-chinas-debt-squeeze\/\">https:\/\/thediplomat.com\/2021\/02\/papua-new-guinea-and-chinas-debt-squeeze\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref10\" name=\"_ftn10\"><sup>[10]<\/sup><\/a>Smith, Graeme. \u201cThe Belt and Road to Nowhere: China\u2019s Incoherent Aid in Papua New Guinea.\u201d <em>The Interpreter<\/em>, 23 Feb. 2018, <a href=\"http:\/\/www.lowyinstitute.org\/the-interpreter\/belt-road-nowhere-china-s-incoherent-aid-papua-new-guinea\">www.lowyinstitute.org\/the-interpreter\/belt-road-nowhere-china-s-incoherent-aid-papua-new-guinea<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref11\" name=\"_ftn11\"><sup>[11]<\/sup><\/a> Imbun, Benedict. (2010). Look North Policy, Asian investment, and Papua New Guineans: A development trinity?. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.researchgate.net\/publication\/294669243_Look_North_Policy_Asian_investment_and_Papua_New_Guineans_A_development_trinity\">https:\/\/www.researchgate.net\/publication\/294669243_Look_North_Policy_Asian_investment_and_Papua_New_Guineans_A_development_trinity<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref12\" name=\"_ftn12\"><sup>[12]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref13\" name=\"_ftn13\"><sup>[13]<\/sup><\/a> Morse, Ian. \u201cLocals Stage Latest Fight against PNG Mine Dumping Waste into Sea.\u201d <em>Mongabay Environmental News<\/em>, 22 May 2020,<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/news.mongabay.com\/2020\/05\/locals-stage-latest-fight-against-png-mine-dumping-waste-into-sea\/\">https:\/\/news.mongabay.com\/2020\/05\/locals-stage-latest-fight-against-png-mine-dumping-waste-into-sea\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref14\" name=\"_ftn14\"><sup>[14]<\/sup><\/a> \u00a0Smith, Graeme. \u201cDreams of Prosperity in Papua New Guinea.\u201d <em>The China Story<\/em>, 2017,<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.thechinastory.org\/yearbooks\/yearbook-2017\/forum-all-i-have-to-do-is-dream\/dreams-of-prosperity-in-papua-new-guinea\/\">https:\/\/www.thechinastory.org\/yearbooks\/yearbook-2017\/forum-all-i-have-to-do-is-dream\/dreams-of-prosperity-in-papua-new-guinea\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref15\" name=\"_ftn15\"><sup>[15]<\/sup><\/a> Imbun, Benedict. (2010). Look North Policy, Asian investment, and Papua New Guineans: A development trinity?. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.researchgate.net\/publication\/294669243_Look_North_Policy_Asian_investment_and_Papua_New_Guineans_A_development_trinity\">https:\/\/www.researchgate.net\/publication\/294669243_Look_North_Policy_Asian_investment_and_Papua_New_Guineans_A_development_trinity<\/a>.; Pryke, Jonathan. \u201cThe Risks of China\u2019s Ambitions in the South Pacific.\u201d <em>Brookings<\/em>, 20 July 2020.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/articles\/the-risks-of-chinas-ambitions-in-the-south-pacific\/\">https:\/\/www.brookings.edu\/articles\/the-risks-of-chinas-ambitions-in-the-south-pacific\/<\/a>.\u00a0<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref16\" name=\"_ftn16\"><sup>[16]<\/sup><\/a> Remeikis, Amy. \u201cScott Morrison and Papua New Guinea\u2019s PM Agree to Joint Naval Base on Manus Island.\u201d <em>The Guardian<\/em>, 1 Nov. 2018,<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/australia-news\/2018\/nov\/01\/scott-morrison-and-papua-new-guineas-pm-agree-to-joint-naval-base-on-manus-island?CMP=share_btn_fb&amp;fbclid=IwAR1KmkAgbgVL6Gxqm0A17-SyJuHfHa7df6Gp5iWz1-_RG8A0YzQ7E28AZx4\">https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/australia-news\/2018\/nov\/01\/scott-morrison-and-papua-new-guineas-pm-agree-to-joint-naval-base-on-manus-island?CMP=share_btn_fb&amp;fbclid=IwAR1KmkAgbgVL6Gxqm0A17-SyJuHfHa7df6Gp5iWz1-_RG8A0YzQ7E28AZx4<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref17\" name=\"_ftn17\"><sup>[17]<\/sup><\/a> Kaiku, Patrick. \u201cNon-Aligned amid Great Power Rivalry? The Case of Papua New Guinea.\u201d <em>Thediplomat.com<\/em>, Aug. 11AD,<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/thediplomat.com\/2018\/11\/non-aligned-amid-great-power-rivalry-the-case-of-papua-new-guinea\/\">https:\/\/thediplomat.com\/2018\/11\/non-aligned-amid-great-power-rivalry-the-case-of-papua-new-guinea\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref18\" name=\"_ftn18\"><sup>[18]<\/sup><\/a> Engle, Stephen, and Ben Westcott. \u201cXi Never Asked for Military Base, Papua New Guinea Leader Says.\u201d <em>Bloomberg.com<\/em>, 19 Nov. 2022,<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/2022-11-19\/xi-never-asked-for-military-base-papua-new-guinea-leader-says\">https:\/\/www.bloomberg.com\/news\/articles\/2022-11-19\/xi-never-asked-for-military-base-papua-new-guinea-leader-says<\/a> Reuters. \u201cAfter China-Solomons Pact, PNG Wants a Security Treaty with Australia.\u201d <em>South China Morning Post<\/em>, 31 Aug. 2022, <a href=\"http:\/\/www.scmp.com\/news\/asia\/australasia\/article\/3190788\/after-china-solomons-pact-papua-new-guinea-says-it-wants?module=perpetual_scroll_0&amp;pgtype=article&amp;campaign=3190788\">www.scmp.com\/news\/asia\/australasia\/article\/3190788\/after-china-solomons-pact-papua-new-guinea-says-it-wants?module=perpetual_scroll_0&amp;pgtype=article&amp;campaign=3190788<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref19\" name=\"_ftn19\"><sup>[19]<\/sup><\/a> See, Peter Connolly, The Belt and Road comes to Papua New Guinea, <em>Security Challenges , 2020, Vol. 16, No. 4, Geo-Economics in the Indo-Pacific (2020)<\/em>,<a href=\"https:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/10.2307\/26976257\">https:\/\/www.jstor.org\/stable\/10.2307\/26976257<\/a> , pp 45; Terry Mobley, \u201cThe Belt and Road Initiative\u201d, <em>Strategic Studies Quarterly , Vol. 13, No. 3 (FALL 2019)<\/em>, pp. 52-72<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref20\" name=\"_ftn20\"><sup>[20]<\/sup><\/a> <a href=\"https:\/\/pacificaidmap.lowyinstitute.org\/\">https:\/\/pacificaidmap.lowyinstitute.org\/<\/a><\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref21\" name=\"_ftn21\"><sup>[21]<\/sup><\/a> James Chin,\u201d Contemporary Chinese Community in Papua\u2013New Guinea: Old Money versus New Migrants\u201d, <em>Chinese Southern Diaspora Studies, Volume Two, 2008<\/em> \u5357\u65b9\u534e\u88d4\u7814\u7a76\u6742\u5fd7, \u7b2c\u4e8c\u5377, 2008, pp 118<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref22\" name=\"_ftn22\"><sup>[22]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid, 123<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref23\" name=\"_ftn23\"><sup>[23]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid, 124<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref24\" name=\"_ftn24\"><sup>[24]<\/sup><\/a> Smith, Graeme. \u201cBeijing\u2019s Orphans? New Chinese Investors in Papua New Guinea.\u201d <em>Pacific Affairs<\/em>, vol. 86, no. 2, 1 June 2013, pp. 327\u2013349.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref25\" name=\"_ftn25\"><sup>[25]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cSeen as heroes at home, Filipino workers feel &#8216;abandoned&#8217; amid Hong Kong&#8217;s COVID surge\u201d, March 17, 2022, NPR, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.npr.org\/sections\/goatsandsoda\/2022\/03\/17\/1086988103\/seen-as-heroes-at-home-filipino-workers-feel-abandoned-amid-hong-kongs-covid-sur\">https:\/\/www.npr.org\/sections\/goatsandsoda\/2022\/03\/17\/1086988103\/seen-as-heroes-at-home-filipino-workers-feel-abandoned-amid-hong-kongs-covid-sur<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref26\" name=\"_ftn26\"><sup>[26]<\/sup><\/a> Stefan Luft, \u201cDie Anwerbung t\u00fcrkischer Arbeitnehmer und ihre Folgen\u201d, <em>Bundeszentrale f\u00fcr politische Bildung<\/em>, 05.08.2014, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.bpb.de\/themen\/europa\/tuerkei\/184981\/die-anwerbung-tuerkischer-arbeitnehmer-und-ihre-folgen\/\">https:\/\/www.bpb.de\/themen\/europa\/tuerkei\/184981\/die-anwerbung-tuerkischer-arbeitnehmer-und-ihre-folgen\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref27\" name=\"_ftn27\"><sup>[27]<\/sup><\/a> Chinese Ministry of Commerce, \u201cInvestment Instructions in Papua New Guinea\u201d \u5bf9\u5916\u6295\u8d44\u5408\u4f5c\u56fd\u522b\uff08\u5730\u533a\uff09\u6307\u5357, \u5df4\u5e03\u4e9a\u65b0\u51e0\u5185\u4e9a, <a href=\"http:\/\/www.mofcom.gov.cn\/dl\/gbdqzn\/upload\/babuyaxinjineiya.pdf\">http:\/\/www.mofcom.gov.cn\/dl\/gbdqzn\/upload\/babuyaxinjineiya.pdf<\/a>, pp15<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref28\" name=\"_ftn28\"><sup>[28]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid, 44<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref29\" name=\"_ftn29\"><sup>[29]<\/sup><\/a> Ibid, 45-46, Note: the complete chart lists 37 companies, China Labor Watch selects 17 companies to present in the report.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref30\" name=\"_ftn30\"><sup>[30]<\/sup><\/a> \u201c\u575a\u6301\u548c\u52a0\u5f3a\u515a\u7684\u9886\u5bfc\u662f\u56fd\u6709\u4f01\u4e1a\u8463\u4e8b\u4f1a\u5efa\u8bbe\u7684\u7279\u8272\u6240\u5728\u201d, \u5149\u660e\u65e5\u62a5, 03.09.2019. <a href=\"http:\/\/www.sasac.gov.cn\/n2588025\/n2588134\/c12138060\/content.html\">http:\/\/www.sasac.gov.cn\/n2588025\/n2588134\/c12138060\/content.html<\/a>: \u201c\u575a\u6301\u515a\u7684\u9886\u5bfc\u3001\u52a0\u5f3a\u515a\u7684\u5efa\u8bbe\uff0c\u662f\u6211\u56fd\u56fd\u6709\u4f01\u4e1a\u7684\u5149\u8363\u4f20\u7edf\uff0c\u662f\u56fd\u6709\u4f01\u4e1a\u7684\u2018\u6839\u2019\u548c\u2018\u9b42\u2019\uff0c\u662f\u6211\u56fd\u56fd\u6709\u4f01\u4e1a\u7684\u72ec\u7279\u4f18\u52bf\u201d<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref31\" name=\"_ftn31\"><sup>[31]<\/sup><\/a> \u201c\u4e00\u56fe\u770b\u61c2\u5168\u56fd\u56fd\u6709\u4f01\u4e1a\u6539\u9769\u4e09\u5e74\u884c\u52a8\u52a8\u5458\u90e8\u7f72\u7535\u89c6\u7535\u8bdd\u4f1a\u8bae, \u56fd\u52a1\u9662\u56fd\u6709\u8d44\u4ea7\u76d1\u5bdf\u59d4\u5458\u4f1a\u201d, 01.10.2020, <a href=\"http:\/\/www.sasac.gov.cn\/n4470048\/n13461446\/n15390485\/n15390500\/c15823765\/content.html#2\">http:\/\/www.sasac.gov.cn\/n4470048\/n13461446\/n15390485\/n15390500\/c15823765\/content.html#2<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref32\" name=\"_ftn32\"><sup>[32]<\/sup><\/a> \u201d\u4f01\u4e1a\u7b80\u4ecb\u201d (Company Overview)\uff0c\u745e\u6728\u954d\u94ec\u7ba1\u7406\uff08\u4e2d\u51b6\uff09\u6709\u9650\u516c\u53f8,\u00a0 <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ramunico.com\/introduction-of-red-wood\/\">https:\/\/www.ramunico.com\/introduction-of-red-wood\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref33\" name=\"_ftn33\"><sup>[33]<\/sup><\/a> Guang Yang and Lixin Yang, \u201cIngrained interests and path-dependency\u201d, <em>Pluto Journals, Work Organisation, Labour &amp; Globalization , 2022, Vol. 16, No. 2<\/em> (2022), pp 88<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref34\" name=\"_ftn34\"><sup>[34]<\/sup><\/a> \u201cThree Irons\u201d is a term to describe the life-time employment and the associated welfare provided by SOEs. Initially implemented during the Maoist Era, the three irons respectively refer to \u201ciron bowl\u201d (complete welfare), \u201ciron wage\u201d (stable incomes), and \u201ciron seat\u201d (life-time employment and retirement stipends)<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref35\" name=\"_ftn35\"><sup>[35]<\/sup><\/a> \u201c\u7ec4\u7ec7\u6846\u67b6\u201d (Organizational Framework), <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ramunico.com\/organizational-structure\/\">https:\/\/www.ramunico.com\/organizational-structure\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref36\" name=\"_ftn36\"><sup>[36]<\/sup><\/a> Note: it remains possible that non-institutional and interpersonal network and feedback mechanisms exist in Ramu<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref37\" name=\"_ftn37\"><sup>[37]<\/sup><\/a> George Simmel, <em>Sociological Aesthetics \u2014 Essays on Art and Aesthetics<\/em>, Austin Harrington, trans, (EBSCO<\/p>\n<p>Publishing, 2020), 100<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref38\" name=\"_ftn38\"><sup>[38]<\/sup><\/a> \u201c\u745e\u6728\u8981\u95fb\u201d, 9-11\u6708, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ramunico.com\/ramu-news\/\">https:\/\/www.ramunico.com\/ramu-news\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref39\" name=\"_ftn39\"><sup>[39]<\/sup><\/a> Li Wen-Lin and Curtis J. Milhaupt, \u201cWe Are the (National) Champions: Understanding the Mechanisms of State Capitalism in China\u201d, <em>Stanford Law Review Vol. 65, No. 4<\/em> (APRIL 2013), pp 707<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref40\" name=\"_ftn40\"><sup>[40]<\/sup><\/a> \u201c\u4f01\u4e1a\u7b80\u4ecb\u201d (Company Overview), <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ramunico.com\/introduction-of-red-wood\/\">https:\/\/www.ramunico.com\/introduction-of-red-wood\/<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref41\" name=\"_ftn41\"><sup>[41]<\/sup><\/a> INDEPENDENT STATE OF PAPUA NEW GUINEA. Chapter 373. Employment Act 1978, Section 130, pp54, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ilo.org\/dyn\/travail\/docs\/1097\/Employment%20Act%201978.pdf\">https:\/\/www.ilo.org\/dyn\/travail\/docs\/1097\/Employment%20Act%201978.pdf<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref42\" name=\"_ftn42\"><sup>[42]<\/sup><\/a> Giorgio Agamben, <em>The State of Exception as a Paradigm of Government<\/em>, translated by Kevin Attell, The University of Chicago Press, (Chicago and London, 2005), 7-35<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"#_ftnref43\" name=\"_ftn43\"><sup>[43]<\/sup><\/a> ILO Indicators of Forced Labor, <a href=\"https:\/\/www.ilo.org\/wcmsp5\/groups\/public\/---ed_norm\/---declaration\/documents\/publication\/wcms_203832.pdf\">https:\/\/www.ilo.org\/wcmsp5\/groups\/public\/&#8212;ed_norm\/&#8212;declaration\/documents\/publication\/wcms_203832.pdf<\/a> , pp3<\/p>\n<p>\u00a0<\/p>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t<\/section>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Download Full Report Executive Summary Since the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, Chinese investment into Papua New Guinea (PNG) has burgeoned. Resulting from China\u2019s deepening economic relations with the island country, a new wave of Chinese migrants to PNG has occurred since 2012-13 and thousands of guest workers now participate in [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":0,"featured_media":7430,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_gspb_post_css":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[12,16],"tags":[722,728,709],"industry":[],"report_year":[],"brand":[],"factory":[],"class_list":["post-7423","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-publications","category-reports","tag-china","tag-chinese-soe","tag-report"],"blocksy_meta":{"styles_descriptor":{"styles":{"desktop":"","tablet":"","mobile":""},"google_fonts":[],"version":8}},"acf":[],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v28.9 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>A Siege From Within: On Chinese SOEs&#039; Operational Structure - Case Papua New Guinea : China Labor Watch<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/chinalaborwatch.org\/zh\/a-siege-from-within-on-chinese-soes-operational-structure-case-papua-new-guinea\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"zh_CN\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"A Siege From Within: On Chinese SOEs&#039; Operational Structure - Case Papua New Guinea : China Labor Watch\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Download Full Report Executive Summary Since the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, Chinese investment into Papua New Guinea (PNG) has burgeoned. 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